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CASENOTES
Broadening the Impact of Section 1983 on Municipalities: Owen v. City of
Independence' — In 1972 George Owen was fired from his position as Chief of
Police of the City of Independence, Missouri.' Although no official reason was
given for the dismissal, it came in the midst of a highly publicized investigation
of possible criminal activity among members of the department. 3 Owen
claimed that he had been stigmatized by the dismissal due to the notoriety sur-
rounding this act, and that, therefore, the City had infringed on his constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in reputation. At the time of the dismissal,
however, the City had no reason to expect that it might be liable for violating
Owen's liberty interest by stigmatizing him in the course of the termination.
Not until ten weeks after Owen was discharged did the Supreme Court of the
United States announce the existence of such an interest in Board of Regents v.
Roth.* Furthermore, even if the City had been aware of such a liberty interest,
it reasonably could have expected to be immune from liability. In Monroe v.
Pape, 5 the Supreme Court had determined that cities were not "persons" who
could be sued for causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 6 After the
Court's pronouncement in Monroe, a municipality enjoyed absolute immunity
from suits brought under section 1983 even if it did cause a deprivation of a
federally protected right. Thus the City Manager who terminated Owen on
' 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
Id. at 629.
Sec text at notes 30-44 infra.
4 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth an assistant professor at a state university was not
rehired. No reasons were given for this action. Although finding for the university on the merits
of the case, the Court suggested that there were circumstances in which a refusal to re-en ploy
might violate a liberty interest — specifically where a plaintiff's "good name, reputation, ht.nor,
or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him. . ." Id. at 573 (quoting
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). Such circumstances might be found
where the government acts in such a way that the plaintiff would be seriously stigmatized or have
other employment opportunities foreclosed. See text at note 70 infra.
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6 Id. at 191-92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1979) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
The independent statutory basis granting jurisdiction for federal courts that is most commonly
invoked is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979), which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person ... No redress the deprivation, under color of
any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
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behalf of the City had reason to think that the dismissal was lawful and that
even if the action was unlawful, the municipality would be immune from suit.
Despite these dual hurdles, Owen initiated a suit in Federal District Court
for the Western District of Missouri against the City of Independence, the City
Manager, and the City Council' alleging that the defendants had deprived him
of a liberty interest because of the manner in which he was discharged. In par-
ticular, Owen asserted that he had been denied due process of law because he
had not been afforded a name-clearing hearing prior to his dismissal. 8
The district court concluded that it could not exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a cause of action based on section 1983 because municipalities
were not covered by that statute. 9 It held, however, that it could imply a cause
of action directly from the fourteenth amendment." Thus, the court reached
Owen also brought a state action for defamation against the City Manager and
against the City Councilman who prepared the allegedly stigmatizing statement. Owen later
dropped the suit against the City Manager and reached a financial settlement with the Coun-
cilman. 445 U.S. at 630 n.9.
Owen v. City of Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1120 (W.D. Mo. 1976). The
petitioner also alleged he had a property interest in his job which entitled him to a pre-
termination hearing. The district court rejected this argument because Owen held his position
"at the will of the City Manager and was subject to discharge without notice of reasons and a
hearing at any time the City Manager determined that his discharge was 'for the good of the serv-
ice.' " Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 938 (8th
Cir. 1977). This ruling was not challenged at the Supreme Court level. 445 U.S. 626 n.3.
Owen also claimed his dismissal was in retaliation for the exercise of his first amend-
ment rights because he had publicly addressed the City's need for more police, pay raises, and
better facilities. The district court found that Owen presented no evidence to support this allega-
tion and the defendants rebutted the inference of any causal connection. 421 F. Supp. at 1122. In
an amended complaint, Owen also alleged that the Charter provision that allowed his discharge
when deemed necessary for the good of the service was vague and overbroad. In addition he
claimed that such a provision, which permitted administrative dcparment heads to be terminated
without a hearing when other high-ranking officials were provided with hearings, constituted an
equal protection violation. Brief for Petitioner at 4. These issues were not addressed in the opin-
ions of any of the courts.
9 42 1 F. Supp. at 1119. Because the City was not a person within the meaning of sec-
tion 1983, see note 5 supra, that section could not be the basis for a remedy. Therefore,
1343(a)(3), see note 6 supra, or § 1343(a)(4), providing for the recovery of damages, equitable
relief, or "other" relief, could not be the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 421 F. Supp. at
1119.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born eviiaturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Implying rights of action directly from the Constitution was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). The Bivens Court held first that a valid cause of action arises under the fourth amendment
when federal agents, acting under color of federal authority, allegedly violate the amendment
and second, that money damages is an appropriate remedy for such an action. Jurisdiction in
Bivens was based upon 28 U:S.C. § 1331, a provision that granted federal jurisdiction where the
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 and the action "arises under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States:: Id. at 394, 397. It should be noted that § 1331 was amended on
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the merits of the case and held that Owen's liberty interest had not been
violated." Both parties appealed; Owen appealed the holding, while the City
appealed on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction." The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit agreed that no action could lie against a municipality pur-
suant to section 1983." It also affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
fourteenth amendment provided Owen with a direct cause of action for
monetary damages.' 4 The court found, however, that Owen was stigmatized
and thus deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law when the City
refused to provide a name-clearing hearing."
The City petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was
granted. 16 Before the Court granted certiorari, however, it had decided Morrell
December 1, 1980, to eliminate the need for any amount in controversy. Federal Question
jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486.
Recently the Supreme Court extended the rationale behind the Bivens holding to other
constitutional amendments. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court held that the
plaintiff who had been discharged from her job as a deputy assistant administrator to a United
States Congressman because of her gender could base a claim directly upon the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 234. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the ad-
tninistratrix for the estate of a deceased federal prisoner was allowed to bring an action based on
the eighth amendment, alleging that prison officials failed to provide the medical care and equip-
ment necessary to treat the deceased. Id. at 18. The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the
question whether the Bivens rationale should be extended to the fourteenth amendment. Mount
Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977). Several courts have employed
/livens in allowing plaintiffs to sue municipalities for fourteenth amendment violations. See, e.g.,
Adekula v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 817-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Donoghue v. Baler,
429 F. Supp. 403, 404-06 (D.N. J. 1977); Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 426 F. Supp. 1272, 1283
(D. Del. 1976). The Supreme Court in 1978, however, vacated and remanded a Second Circuit
decision, Turpin v. Maillet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), which had implied a right under the
fourteenth amendment and had granted relief against a municipality for the unconstitutional acts
of its employees. The Court sought reconsideration by the Second Circuit in tight of Monet! v.
New York Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which held that the same result could be
obtained under 5 1983. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978). Since the outcome
would be the same, under an implied right theory or a 5 1983 theory, vacating Turpin may in-
dicate that the Court is still unprepared to extend Bivens to the fourteenth amendment. But see
Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under The Fourteenth Amendment, 70 N.w. U. L. REV. 770
(1976). Indeed, on remand the Second Circuit concluded that "there is no place for a cause of ac-
tion against a municipality directly under the 14th Amendment, because the plaintiff may pro-
ceed against the City of West Haven under 5 1983." City of West Haven v. Turpin, 591 F.2d
426, 427 (1979).
" 421 F. Supp. at 1122. The court found that Owen had no property interest in his job
nor was he stigmatized and thus deprived of a liberty interest by the circumstances of his
discharge. The court further concluded that the defendants disproved the imposition of a stigma
by a preponderance of the evidence because (1) Owen was terminated pursuant to the City
Charter and no statement imputing any illegal, immoral, or other "sigmatizing" conduct to him
was put in his record; (2) the Councilman's statement was not causally connected to Owen's ter-
mination since the decision to replace Owen was made prior to the Council meeting; and (3) the
supervisor of the investigation and the grand jury exonerated Owen of any criminal charges. Id.
at 1120-22.
" The defendants challenged the ruling that they were subject to suit under 28 U.S.C.
5 1331 and the fourteenth amendment. 560 F.2d at 931.
Is Id.
Id. at 933.
" Id. at 937.
16 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
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v. New York Department of Social Services)? In that case the Court held that a sec-
tion 1983 suit can be brought against a municipality when the injury claimed
resulted from a city's policy, custom, or usage." In light of Monell, the Court
remanded Owen v. City of Independence to the court of appeals for reconsidera-
tion." On remand the court of appeals applied Monet! and reaffirmed its
previous finding that a fourteenth amendment violation had been proved. 20
The court concluded that Owen's complaint stated a cause of action under sec-
tion 1983 but held that all the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity because
the city officials had acted in good faith." This time Owen petitioned for cer-
tiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition" in order to resolve the issue
whether cities enjoyed qualified immunity based on the good faith of the cities'
officials. This issue had not been addressed in Monet!.
In reviewing the court of appeals' decision, the United States Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that the good faith of a municipality's of-
ficials or agents is no defense to an action brought against the City pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 5 1983." The Court found nothing in the language or history of sec-
tion 1983 nor anything in the common law at the time the section was drafted
that would support a rule of qualified immunity. 24
 To buttress this construction
of section 1983, the Court added that holding municipalities liable for damages
is necessary to accomplish the central aim of the Civil Rights Acts of the
1870's, 25 of which section 1983 is but one provision. This aim was "to provide
protection to those persons wronged by the misuse of power, possessed by vir-
tue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
" 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
" Id. at 690-91. In Mandl, several female employees of the Department of Social Serv-
ices and the Board of Education of New York City challenged the official policy of those depart-
ments which required pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves
were required medically. Id. at 661. The Court, holding that 5 1983 applies to local governments,
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. at 702.
19
 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
2° 589 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 337-38.
22 444 U.S. 822 (1979).
23 445 U.S. at 634.
24 Id. at 635-37.
25 Id. at 650. The statutes were originally passed in response to the southern states' un-
willingness or inability to remedy the violations of civil rights caused primarily by the violence of
the Ku Klux Klan. In 1871, speaking in support of the Act of April 20, 1871 (popularly known as
the Ku Klux Klan Act), Rep. Beatty of Ohio emphasized these lawless conditions:
certain states have denied to persons within their jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. The proof of the point is voluminous and unquestionable. . . [M]en
were murdered, houses were burned, women were outraged, men were scourged,
and officers of the law were shot down: and the State made no successful effort to
bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and
innocent. The State, from lack of power or inclination, practically denied the
equal protection of the law to these persons.
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. at 428. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History Of
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the 'Background'
of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L. J. 5 (1974); Note, Developments in the Law; Section 1983 And FederalisM,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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the authority of state law." 26 The Court explained that section 1983's provision
of a cause of action against wrongdoers acting under color of state law pro-
tected the injured person by compensating him for past deprivations of federal
rights and by deterring future violations of such rights. 27 Such protection would
be lost, the Court noted, if the government were allowed to disavow liability for
its injurious conduct."
The significance of Owen v. City of Independence is twofold. It lies not only in
its holding that cities arc subject to "strict liability,"" but also in its am-
biguous expansion of a liberty interest. This casenote will discuss both of these
aspects of the Owen decision and their potential impact on municipalities. First,
the facts surrounding Owen's dismissal will be presented. This presentation
will be followed by an examination of how the recognition of a liberty interest
based on these facts has expanded the concept of due process of law. Next, the
Court's reasoning for imposing strict liability on the City will be set forth. In
analyzing this reasoning particular attention will be focused on the policy con-
siderations on which the Court relied as well as those that the majority ignored.
This casenote will then examine the overall effect of this decision on
municipalities. It will be submitted that because of the combination of the
unexplained and undefined expansion of a liberty interest with the Court's
disregard of important policy considerations, the Owen holding needs to be
reconsidered to present municipalities some defense in similar liberty interest
cases.
I. THE SEARCH FOR A LIBERTY INTEREST
A. Owen's Case Against the City of Independence
George Owen had been appointed Chief of Police of the City of In-
dependence for an indefinite period." During Owen's administration certain
discrepancies in the records of the police property room were found." An in-
vestigation ordered by the City Manager resulted in a finding that there was
"no evidence of any criminal acts or of any violation of state or municipal law
in the administration of the property room." 32 This finding notwithstanding,
the City Manager asked Owen to resign and offered Owen an advisory position
with the Department." Owen, however, refused to resign." Following another
26 445 U.S. at 650 (quotations omitted).
" Id. at 651-52.
28 Id. at 651.
29 Id. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3° 445 U.S. at 625.
Id. The most serious of these discrepancies was discovered in March, 1972, when a
handgun that supposedly had been destroyed by the police was found in the possession of a felon
in Kansas City. Additionally, money and narcotics had disappeared without explanation and two
television sets had been signed out by the petitioner for his personal use. Id. at 625, 627-28.
32 Id. at 625-26.
" 421 F. Supp. at 1114-15.
34 445 U.S. at 626.
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meeting between the two men, the City Manager again warned Owen that if
he did not resign or accept the alternative position he would be fired. 35 Subse-
quently, the City Manager issued a public statement concerning the property
room investigation adding that "[s]teps have been initiated on an administra-
tive level to correct these discrepancies" found in the administration, handling,
and security of recorded property. 38
 This statement was reported in a local
paper."
A few days later at a City Council meeting, one of the members read his
own secretly prepared statement about the investigation. 38 He then moved that
the full investigative report be made public and "that the City Council recom-
mend to the City Manager 'that he should take all direct and appropriate ac-
tion permitted under the Charter against such persons as are shown by the in-
vestigation to have been involved in illegal, wrongful, or gross inefficient ac-
tivities brought out in the investigative reports.' "39 The motion was passed by
a substantial majority of the Council." The following day, exercising his power
under the City Charter to remove heads of administrative departments, the
City Manager discharged Owen without stating specific reasons for the dis-
missal. 4 ' The local press reported that the discharge resulted from the investi-
gation." Owen's request for specific grounds for his discharge and appellate
review of his termination were denied by the City." Because Owen could not
obtain an administrative review of this decision, he initiated a suit in federal
district court. 44
The district court, relying upon the standard enunciated in Roth, held that
Owen had not suffered a constitutionally cognizable injury. The court con-
cluded that Owen's discharge did not foreclose his ability to obtain other
employment. 45 There were no statements in Owen's official employment rec-
" 421 F. Supp. at 1115.
58 Id. The City Manager did not release the details of the investigation but intended to
keep these confidential. Id. He did speak with a police lieutenant, however, about the latter's
willingness to assume Owen's position. Id.
" Id.
38 Id. No other city official knew of this statement. In fact the statement and motion did
not even appear on the Council's agenda. Id.
38 Id. at 1115-16.
40 Id. at 1116. Section 2.11 of the City Charter, however, expressly prohibits the City
Council from influencing the City Manager's appointment and discharge of city employees. Id.
at 1113.
4 ' Id. at 1113. Section 3.3(1) gives the City Manager the sole power to "Ialppoint, and
when deemed necessary for the good of the service, to lay off, suspend, demote, or remove all
directors, or heads of administrative departments, and all other administrative officers and
employees of the city." Id.
42 445 U.S. at 628. On Owen's official employment record maintained by the City, his
discharge is recorded as occurring pursuant to S 3.3(1) of the Charter. No specific reasons or
charges appear on the record. Brief for the Respondent at 5.
" 421 F. Supp. at 1113. The Charter did not provide that the Chief of Police was en-
titled to any notice of reasons, or a hearing, in connection with the termination of his employ-
ment. Id.
44 See note 8 supra.
43 421 F. Supp. at 1121.
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ord charging him with any illegal or immoral conduct." Furthermore, the
court found no connection between Owen's discharge and the Council's
resolution because the City Manager had obtained Owen's replacement prior
to the Council meeting.¢' Moreover, the Council was precluded, by the City
Charter, from influencing the City Manager's decision; thus, the Council was
acting ultra vires." Finally, Owen had been publicly exoneratedof any illegal or
immoral conduct prior to his termination by the City Manager and after his
discharge by the grand jury." Thus, the district court concluded that Owen's
discharge was not related to any charge which would prevent his future
employment.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit also relied upon Roth but reached the op-
posite result. 5° The appeals court reasoned that the City of Independence "as
employer served to blacken Owen's name and reputation."." The court em-
phasized the Councilman's statement and the connection that the press had
drawn between the statement and the discharge." Since the charges against
Owen were made by a City Councilman and were connected "in the eyes of
the public" with Owen's termination, the court concluded that under Roth the
City had deprived Owen of a liberty interest without due process of law. 53
Judge Van Oosterhout, the sole dissenter, disagreed with the majority's
approach of using the public's perception, based on newspaper stories, to find
a causal connection. He found the perception to be an incorrect one since the
official discharge notice was devoid of any stigmatizing comments. Further-
more, he concluded, the public's impression was the result of newspaper ac-
counts and not the result of any municipal action. 54 Thus, he would have af-
firmed the trial court's determination that Owen was not stigmatized in the
course of his discharge because that court's conclusion was supported by
substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous." Furthermore, the dissent
expressed concern that the majority's holding would convert every defamation
by a public official into a due process violation." According to the dissent, such
a result was not the intention of the Supreme Court."
The court of appeals, by finding a causal connection in the eyes of the
public between the discharge and the defamation, was not merely applying
Roth; rather, it was superimposing Roth onto a very different set of facts. In
Roth the Court had found that the connection arose from the actual termination
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1121-22. See note 11 supra.
" 560 F.2d at 937.
Id.
" Id. at 936.
" Id. at 937.
." Id. at 942 (Oosterhout, J., dissenting).
" Id.
56 Id.
87 Id. at 941-42.
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of employment. It was the action of the employer, itself, in discharging its em-
ployee that created the employee's injury. The Court did not look to any im-
pressions that the event might have made on outsiders." Yet this is exactly
what the court of appeals did in Owen. In essence the decision by the court of
appeals was an expansion of the Roth standard. Instead of confining itself to the
City Manager's decision to discharge Owen, the court looked to events that
happened around the same time as the personnel decision. Indeed, the Coun-
cilman's statement and its subsequent adoption by the City Council did not
take place until after the City Manager decided to terminate Owen, although
the City Council meeting was held the night before the City Manager actually
implemented his plan." Thus, by looking to the Councilman's statement, the
court of appeals looked beyond the circumstances particular to the termination
to establish a causal connection between the dismissal and the stigma claim of
the employee. Yet the court did not delineate how far a court may wander from
the events that occurred in the course of the termination in order to find that
link. The majority opinion stated only:
The fact of actual stigma to Owen connected with his discharge is unde-
niable, for the action of the City of Independence as employer served
to blacken Owen's name and reputation. That the stigmatizing
charges did not come from the city manager and were not included
in the discharge notice is immaterial because the official actions of
the city council released charges against Owen contemporaneous
and, in the eyes of the public, connected with that discharge. 60
Thus, according to the court, the publicity given to the discharge and the de-
famatory statement of the Councilman was sufficient to establish a due process
violation
When the case was decided by the Supreme Court, although four justices
reached the same conclusion as the dissent in the court of appeals, 6 ' the majori-
ty accepted the finding of a constitutional injury." While the majority gave the
liberty interest summary treatment, discussing it only in a footnote," neverthe-
less, the Court's conclusion was a significant statement with respect to the
liberty interest concept. It simply dismissed the challenge to the court's finding
of a liberty interest as having "no merit. ''64
58
 408 U.S. at 570.
59 445 U.S. at 629.
60 560 F.2d at 937. The language of this expanded standard actually appeared the year
before in Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (in connection with a job termination). Yet
the Velger Court avoided applying the standard by finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim.
The decision rested solely on the plaintiff's failure to allege and prove that the charges which
harmed his reputation, id.• at 626, were substantially false. Id. at 628.
61 445 U.S. at 658.
" Id. at 633 n.13.
83 Id. This issue was not raised by the City until it filed its brief. Id. See Brief for the
Respondent at 45-47.
81
 445 U.S. at 633 n.13.
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The implementation of this new standard is inconsistent with previous
Supreme Court cases that had considered the nature of a liberty interest in
public employment. In Owen the Court implied that defamation alone, with on-
ly a loose causal relation to loss of employment, may be sufficient to rise to the
level of a constitutional injury. Such an overinclusive standard is at odds with
the narrow construction that the Court had attempted to give to the stigma
theory of injury shortly before Owen." Prior to Owen the Court had found con-
stitutional violations only when reputational harm directly resulted in an
economic injury. 66 Yet after Owen it appears that reputation alone is a constitu-
tionally protected interest sufficient to trigger fourteenth amendment protec-
tions automatically. Thus, Owen represents a radical departure from the nar-
rower trend in prior cases of defamation by a public official, as applied in Paul
v. Davis67 and Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy," where injury to reputation, without
more, was insufficient for fourteenth amendment purposes.
B. The Evolution of a Liberty Interest in Reputation:
Defamation Alone Not a Constitutional Injury Until Owen
The development of a stigma theory — namely that reputation is a con-
stitutionally protected interest and thus, defamation by a public official was a
constitutional violation — has been erratic. At the early stages of the theory's
development, the Supreme Court intimated that reputational harm serious
enough to jeopardize future employment possibilities triggered the protection
of the fourteenth amendment. 69 The Court later seemingly broadened this
definition of a liberty interest to include reputational harm standing alone,"
but it later retreated to the earlier standard. 7 ' In Owen the Court appears to
have reversed this retreat and is moving again toward expanding the scope of a
liberty interest.
The evolution of this stigma theory began against the political backdrop of
the McCarthy era." The leading case, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath," concerned the practice of placing certain organizations that had
been designated by the Attorney General as Communist on a list to be submit-
ted to the Loyalty Review Board whose function was to assess the loyalty of
government employees. 74 Because of the nationwide publicity given to the
65 See Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L.
Rev. 191 (1977).
66 See Section 1.8. infra.
67 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
" 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
69 See text at notes 73-92 infra.
" See text at notes 93-99 infra.
7 ' Sec text at notes 100-18 infra.
72 Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 217-23 (1977).
" 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
74 Id. at 125.
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listing, the listed organizations suffered severe economic harm. 75 Although
several of the organizations denied Communist affiliation, they were not given
the opportunity to rebut the Attorney General's determination. 76
 In a plurality
opinion the McGrath Court held that the Attorney General could not place
organizations on the list arbitrarily." The basis for the holding was that the Ex-
ecutive Order under which the Attorney General acted did not grant him the
authority to list organizations without making the "appropriate determina-
tions. "" The concurring opinions implied that some form of due process is re-
quired if an employee has been branded with a "badge of infamy" when
discharged. 79 This case indicated what the developing standard might be but
did not clarify in what circumstances, other than the extreme one in McGrath, a
constitutional injury would be found.
The following year, in Wieman u. Updegraff, 8° the Court further defined
and reinforced the stigma theory by holding that a charge of disloyalty may be
a "badge of infamy."8 ' In Wieman the plaintiff brought an action to enjoin
state officials from paying further salaries to state employees who refused to
take the loyalty oath mandated by statute for all state officials and employees. 82
The appellants, various state employees, intervened claiming the statute was
invalid for several reasons including the reason that it deprived them of their
due process rights." The Court held the statute unconstitutional." The
Wieman holding, however, rested on the Court's finding that a statute that re-
quired state employees to swear that they were not currently nor at any time
within the preceeding five years members of "subversive" groups listed by the
United States Attorney General was patently arbitrary and discriminatory
because it did not distinguish between members who knew the true nature of
the groups and those who did not." Furthermore, these listings had a poten-
tially chilling effect upon the individual's first amendment associational rights.
Yet, since the underlying harm in Wieman was a branding of disloyalty, its
holding reaffirmed the holding in McGrath.
" /d.at 129.
" Id. at 126.
" Id. at 137-38.
" Id. at 136.
75 Justice Black's concurring opinion suggested that due process is required when
blacklists are used as a sanctioning tool. Id. at 114-45 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
found that procedural requirements are mandated whenever the government imposes a
"grievous loss." Id. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Douglas found that due process
is required before any organization could be "branded as 'subversive.' " Id. at 175-76 (Douglas,
J., concurring). Justice Jackson suggested that it was the disqualification from government
employment that was the basis for the due process requirement. Id. at 184-85 (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
BD 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
a' Id. at 190-91.
82 Id. at 184-85.
" Id. at 185.
84 Id. at 192.
85 Id. at 190.
March 1982]	 CASENOTES	 457
Nine years later, the Court in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy" clarified the
standard announced in Wieman and suggested that in some instances govern-
ment-imposed stigma could be so harmful as to entitle the victim to a hearing
in order to rebut the stigmatizing allegations. 87 Cafeteria Workers involved a cook
who lost her job at a government cafeteria because she failed to receive a securi-
ty clearance. Although the plaintiff was not afforded a hearing, the Court did
not find a constitutional injury. 88 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff was not
entitled to notice and a hearing because her exclusion was reasonable and in
accordance with the provisions of her contract. 89 The Court concluded that the
denial of a security pass raised inferences only as to certain character deficien-
cies of the plaintiff." Such an injury to the plaintiff's reputation, the Court
held, was insufficient to mandate due process protections." The Court added
that the government had not acted in such a way as "to bestow a badge of
disloyalty or infamy, with the attendant foreclosure from other employment
opportunity." 92 Cafeteria Workers added to the uncertainty surrounding the
development of the stigma theory. Arguably, its only distinction from the
earlier cases was that the employee's injury occurred from the government's
failure to grant a security clearance and that this refusal has a different impact
upon future employment opportunities than an actual label as a Communist or
a disloyal individual.
The holdings in McGrath, Wieman, and Cafeteria Workers were typical of the
Court's early approach to reputational injury. In those cases the Court viewed
the liberty interest as an interest in reputation free only from a "badge of
disloyalty or infamy" so great as to foreclose other employment. Apparently
only this type of injury mandated due process.
This narrow view arguably changed in Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 93 In Con-
stantineau the plaintiff was forbidden to purchase or receive liquor for one year
because of a determination by the chief of police that she had a "drinking prob-
lem. "94
 Furthermore, the police chief posted notices to this effect without noti-
fying the plaintiff or giving her an opportunity to rebut the allegation." The
plaintiff filed suit claiming that her due process rights had been violated. The
Court held that the posting violated the plaintiff's liberty interest by imposing a
"6 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
" Id. at 898-99.
" Id. at 898.
"9 Id.
9° Id, at 899. Although the denial of a pass could raise an inference of disloyalty, the
Court stated it also could have implied that plaintiff was "garrulous, or careless with her iden-
tification badge." Id.
"1 Id.
92 Id. at 898.
93 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
" The Wisconsin statute allowed the determination to be made by designated people,
including the Chief of Police. Id. at 434 n.2.
95 Id. at 435.
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stigma. 96
 Therefore, the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing were
deemed to be necessary." The Court declared:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential. "Posting" under the Wiscon-
sin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a
stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading
one. 98
From the language of Constantineau, therefore, it appeared that the Court had
adopted a more expansive standard of the liberty interest — one that was in-
clusive enough to protect reputational injury by the government without any
additional harm. 99
In Board of Regents v. Roth'°° the Court applied the Constantineau standard
restrictively. The Roth Court adopted the language from Constantineau that due
process is required where "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake" and applied it to the termination of public employment.'°' In Roth the
plaintiff had been hired by the state university to teach for one academic
year.'" At the end of that year he learned he would not be rehired, but the state
university refused to provide reasons for this decision."' Roth alleged that his
unexplained dismissal injured his reputation and that he deserved at least an
opportunity to undo this harm at a name-clearing hearing. 104 The Court,
however, declined to find a due process violation. The Court stated that in
order for a constitutional violation to occur there must be an accusation "that
might seriously damage ... [or foreclose} freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities.'" 05 Viewed against the earlier blacklisting cases,
this was a strong suggestion that damage to reputation alone does not trigger
the requirement of a name-clearing hearing. According to the Court, before a
liberty interest in reputation can mandate procedural safeguards it must be
present in conjunction either with accusations that would chill exercise of first
amendment associational rights, with a property interest in the right that is
96 Id,
" Id. at 437.
98 Id.
99 But see Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
'°° 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
'°' Id. at 573.
'° 2 Id. at 566.
'" Id.
184 Id. at 569.
105 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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denied, or with the foreclosure of future employment opportunities. 106 There
must be "stigma plus. 107
The "stigma plus" notion was carried over to areas other than the ter-
mination of employment. In Gass a. Lopez,'° 8 some high school students were
suspended for ten days, without a hearing prior to or within a reasonable time
after the suspension. The Court held that the students' due process rights had
been violated.' 09 First, the Court concluded that the students had a property
106 In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), a companion case to Roth, the plaintiff
claimed that a state college's failure to rehire him was in retaliation for his exercise of first amend-
ment rights. Id. at 595. Although the Court declined to hold the college's action invalid, it re-
affirmed its earlier pronouncements that "the renewal of a nontenured public school teacher's
one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights." Id. at 598. The plaintiff also claimed that the college's failure to rehire him without first
giving him a hearing deprived him of his property interest in his job. Id. at 599-600. Reviewing
this claim, the Court concluded that an "informal" tenure system did give the plaintiff a proper-
ty interest in his job. Id. at 603. Thus, it was the violation of both the first amdendment rights
and the property interest, not simply any reputational harm, which created the right to notice
and opportunity to be heard.
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), a civil service employee was discharged for
making false and reckless charges that a superior had accepted a bribe. Justice Rehnquist, in a
plurality decision, looked not at the nature of the right involved — the plaintiff's statutory expec-
tation of continued employment — but rather at the fact that the legislation that conferred the ex-
pectancy also limited the procedural guarantees. Id. at 151-52. Therefore, he concluded that "a
litigant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 154. According
to the plurality, a liberty interest violation would exist only if there were no name-clearing hear-
ing when the "dismissal [was] based upon an unsupported charge which could wrongfully injure
the reputation of an employee." Id. at 157.
In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), a police officer who was discharged without a
hearing claimed a property interest in his job under a city ordinance. The Court rejected this con-
tention, upholding the district court's conclusion that the petitioner "held his position at the will
and pleasure of the city." Id. at 345. In addition, the police officer claimed that his liberty interest
was violated because the reasons given for his discharge were false. In rejecting this claim, the
Court explained that the reasons articulated for the discharge had not been made public.
Therefore, no harm to reputation was involved. Id. at 348. Furthermore, the Court refused to
review what it characterized as a "personnel decision." Id. at 349. Even if the charges
precipitating the dismissal were false, the Court concluded, "It]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions."
Id. at 350.
107
 Lower courts, although acknowledging the standard set forth in Roth, did not always
reach consistent results. For example, in Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974), the
chairman of the State Liquor Control Commission was discharged by the governor for "in-
competence, neglect of duty and malfeasance in office." Id. at 1004. In examining the liberty in-
terest claim the court held that, when read in context, the statement did not deprive the plaintiff
of due process. Id. at 1007. See also Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1977) (Where an
employee retains his employment, even after a demotion, his reputational harm does not rise to
the level of a liberty interest violation); Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 390 (10th Cir. 1976)
(discharged member of museum board suffered reputational harm at most, not a liberty interest
violation when terminated); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1976) (transfers of
teachers after each suffered reputational harm not a liberty deprivation); and Danno v. Peterson,
421 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (same).
" 419 U.S. 565, 569-71 (1975).
109 Id. at 572.
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interest in their education that derived from a state statute."° Thus the
primary reason for finding a due process violation was the deprivation of a
property interest. Only then did the Court go on to conclude that there was a
liberty interest violation as well because "those charges [i.e., the grounds for
the suspension] could seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow
pupils and teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher
education and employment.""' Furthermore, the Court noted, the reputa-
tional injury that the students would suffer would appear on their transcripts
and could prevent admission to advanced educational institutions, thus
foreclosing future opportunities." 2
 Therefore, the reputational harm incurred
by the students and relied upon by the Court in Goss went beyond mere
defamation because it served to narrow their future options. It appears, then,
that the Court relied on a "stigma plus" standard, just as it had in Roth. Yet
Goss and Roth are difficult to reconcile with the Court's pronouncement in Con-
stantineau. When reputational harm would mandate due process protections re-
mained unclear.
In Paul v. Davis"' the Court attempted to clarify what kind of reputational
harm was necessary to mandate procedural guarantees. In Paul a plaintiff who
had been arrested for shoplifting, but not yet tried, alleged that his reputation
had been so stigmatized as to impair his future employment opportunities
because he was identified to storeowners as a shoplifter."' The Court squarely
rejected a liberty interest resting on reputation alone and denied that any
previous cases stood for such a proposition.' ' 5 The Court explained that "the
Court has never held that the mere defamation of an individual, whether by
branding him disloyal or otherwise, was sufficient to invoke the guarantees of
procedural due process absent an accompanying loss of government employ-
ment." 16 For example, the Paul Court asserted that the holding in Constan-
tineau rested on a property right, granted by the state "to purchase or obtain li-
quor in common with the rest of the citizenry,"" 7
 not on a liberty interest in
reputation. The Paul decision, therefore, precluded a constitutional injury
unless the defamation is causally connected with the termination of govern-
ment employment."° Furthermore, to trigger constitutional protection the
defamation arguably would have to occur in conjunction with an employment
loss where the employment itself was a property interest. Employees in non-
tenured positions, such as Roth and Owen, could not claim such property in-
terests in their jobs.
"° Id. at 573.
"' Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 575 n.7.
" 3
 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 696. The charges were subsequently dropped. Id.
115 Id. at 699.
16 424 U.S. at 706.
"' Id. at 708.
"" Id. at 709.
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Owen held his job subject to termination at will. 19 Clearly there was no
property interest. At most the Owen Court was presented with a defamatory
statement 12° made by a high-ranking city official which, even according to the
majority's finding, did not motivate the decision to terminate Owen's employ-
ment.' 2 ' According to the facts accepted by the Court, the City Manager had
already decided to fire Owen when the statement was made. Indeed, the City
Manager already had found a replacement for Owen before the Councilman
made his statement.' 22 To allow a plaintiff to claim a constitutional violation
because a defamatory statement was made around the time the personnel deci-
sion was implemented not only expands prior case law, but also allows that
plaintiff to take advantage of a fortuitous occurrence to establish the constitu-
tional injury.'"
Such a result seems at odds with the result reached by the Court in Mount
Healthy School District Board of Education o. Doyle. 124 In Mt. Healthy the Court
refused to allow such fortuitous circumstances to establish a constitutional
violation. The plaintiff in that case, a teacher, had telephoned a radio station
and described a proposed dress code for teachers at his school. When his con-
tract was not renewed — an action that prevented the granting of tenure — his
call to the radio station was cited as one of several reasons for the failure to
rehire. Since the Court found that the other reasons provided sufficient in-
dependent grounds for Doyle's termination,'" the Court held that the plaintiff
could not use the first amendment infringement claim to get a remedy. 126 The
Court reasoned that such an outcome would result in a windfall for the plaintiff
and stated that "[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected
conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire,
could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of con-
stitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done
nothing."'" Thus, even though the failure to reappoint the plaintiff amounted
to a loss of employment in part for exercising first amendment rights, the Court
did not order reinstatement. It co rrectly recognized that the employer had suf-
ficient legitimate reasons to justify its action. The mere fact that the teacher
"9 421 F. Supp. at 1120.
"° As the district court noted, the statement accused Owen of being a .poor ad-
ministrator, nothing more. 421 F. Supp. at 1122.
121 445 U.S. at 671 n.13.
12 Id. at 660.
123 In fact Owen chose termination rather than accepting an advisory position. Id.
' 2+ 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
125 These included fighting with other teachers and cafeteria workers and making an
obscene gesture to two female students. Id. at 281-82.
126 Id. at 285. The Court stated: "[w]e are thus brought to the issue whether, even if .
the protected conduct played a `substanial part' in the actual decision not to renew, [the termina-
tion] would necessarily amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial action. We think
that it would not." Id.
" 7 Id. See DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminately Discharge Gases: The Impact of Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLRA, 66 GEO. L.J. 1109 (1978).
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had chosen to speak out shortly before his termination was not enough to
negate the valid reasons for his discharge.
From the underlying policy consideration in Mt. Healthy, it would follow
that a plaintiff also should not be permitted to enjoy a windfall because of
statements made by an individual not directly involved in the discharge proc-
ess. In Owen, however, this is exactly the result that the majority allowed.
Owen was put in a position he never would have enjoyed but for the Coun-
cilman's statement. Owen was awarded back pay he would have earned had he
continued as police chief128
 when in fact he would have been discharged
regardless of the Councilman's statement. To be consistent with Mt. Healthy,
the Owen Court should have examined more closely the evidence produced by
the City. The City met the burden of proving that the City Manager had
already decided to replace Owen and that any defamation that Owen suffered
was immaterial to the decision to replace him.'" Inasmuch as the City
Manager could have discharged Owen for any reason, permitting Owen to
claim that he was stigmatized because of the defamatory remarks made in-
dependent of the decision to discharge him has opened the door to a broad
range of claims. Now any discharged government employee can claim a con-
stitutional injury if he can show that he has been defamed, regardless of
whether the discharge and the defamation have a close causal connection. As a
result of Owen it appears that a causal connection need not be demonstrated be-
tween the defamation and the dismissal so long as the events occur around the
same time.'" This tenuous connection, one that occurred "in the eyes of the
public""' despite the City Charter's explicit prohibition of interference by the
City Council in some personnel decisions,'" raises questions about the scope
of municipal liability. Under Owen it seems that a municipality may be held
liable merely because it appears to have acted impermissibly in the public eye.
US
 Owen could not be reinstated since he had reached the mandatory retirement age
during the course of the litigation. 445 U.S. at 632 n.12. The money that he received, however,
was the back pay he would have earned minus the amount he received in his defamation action
against the Councilman. Id.
"9
 According to Mt. Healthy, once the plaintiff has proved that he engaged in constitu-
tionally protected conduct and that such conduct was a substantial factor in the dismissal deci-
sion, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision absent the conduct in question. 429 U.S. at 287. In Owen the district court and the
dissents in the court of appeali and Supreme Court were satisfied that the defendants clearly met
this burden. 421 F. Supp. at 1122; 560 F.2d at 941; 445 U.S. at 657.
13° In Owen the fact that the statement occurred about twelve hours prior to Owen's ac-
tual termination was important to the Court because it made the two events appear connected.
Yet the Court did not establish guidelines to determine how close in time the two events must oc-
cur to establish a sufficient nexus to prove a stigmatizing injury. See Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d
193*(2d Cir. 1977) (post-discharge statement by officials that teacher was discharged for miscon-
duct not sufficient).
"' 560 F.2d at 937.
1 " See note 40 supra.
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C. The Nexus Necessary for Municipal Liability in Section 1983 Actions:
Was the City Liable Because It Looked Liable?
The Owen majority relegated the entire causation issue to a footnote. By
doing so, it implied that there was little need for any extended discussion of the
issue. For the majority it was sufficient that the public perceived Owen's
dismissal to be the result of the City Council's resolution "even if [the state-
ment and the resolution] did not in point of fact 'cause' petitioner's
discharge. ." 133 Since the Council's actions did not "cause" the discharge
but only the reputational harm, however, it was inconsistent with the holding
in Paul for the Court to have imposed liability. In Paul mere defamation caused
by a public official was not enough to warrant due process rights. Although
Owen did not explicitly overrule the holding in Paul, it does appear to have ex-
panded the Paul standard beyond recognition and without explanation. An
understanding of the Owen Court's departure from Paul might be gained
through an analysis of the nexus between the stigma and Owen's termination.
For the stigma and the dismissal to be causally related, it would seem both
would have to have originated from a common source — the City. In some
manner the City, to be liable, must be responsible for the reputational harm as
well as the termination. Three possible theories might support a finding that
the City was liable for the stigma: (1) the City, as employer of the Councilman,
is liable under the principle of respondeat superior; (2) the City, as an entity, is
the City Manager and the City Council and actions by one cannot be distin-
guished legally from actions by the other; and (3) the City, as a singular entity
vis-a-vis the public, is liable because it appears to be liable to the public. Under
the first rationale, the relationship of the municipality to the harm is merely
that of the employer to harm caused by an employee-tortfeasor. In this context
a city cannot be held liable. The Court has expressly rejected this theory as a
basis for municipal liability' 34 although it has not expressly indicated its
rationale. The use of respondeat superior, however, would open municipal
liability to seemingly endless limits. Any tort committed by an employee dur-
ing the course of his employment would result in liability for the city.
Under the second rationale, the municipality would be liable in those in-
stances in which "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision of-
ficially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers" 135
 causes the con-
" 3 445 U.S. at 633-34 n.13. In a concurring opinion in Adams v. Walker, see note 107
supra, Judge Stevens, now Justice Stevens who joined the majority in Owen, agreed that there was
no deprivation of a liberty interest and added that in a political context there is a routine "use [of]
uncomplimentary language about one another — a context in which First Amendment interests
override a State's interest in enforcing its own law of defamation. . . ." 492 F.2d at 1010
(Stevens, J., concurring). Additionally, Judge Stevens explained that the discretionary nature of
the personnel decision would render any hearing "meaningless — nothing more than an oppor-
tunity to test the firmness of the governor's prior decision — or else would involve an excessive
invasion by the federal judiciary into the making of policy by the State." Id. (footnote omitted).
' 34 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 691.
1 " Id. at 690.
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stitutional injury. 136
 These theories do not appear to have been adopted by the
Owen Court. Although the majority accepted the decision of the court of ap-
peals that the stigma was caused by an official policy, neither the court of ap-
peals nor the Supreme Court enunciated what the policy was or how it came in-
to existence. 137 Owen did not show that the interference in his termination by
the Council was caused by any municipal policy. Indeed the City's policy in
terminating certain officials, as articulated in the City Charter, was to allow
the City Manager to terminate those employees at will.'" No reputational
harm attached to Owen as a direct consequence of the City Manager's act.
Rather, it was the public's perception of the discharge based upon newspaper
articles that supplied the nexus. While this may be sufficient to show defama-
tion, it does not establish an injury beyond that. Thus it cannot satisfy the
"stigma plus" test set forth in Paul.
The Owen Court established a new test, under which it held the City liable
because it looked liable. Under this test the causal connection can be estab-
lished by determining how the City looked in the eyes of the public. In Owen the
headlines in the local press constituted a critical factor. Among the headlines
were: "Lid Off Probe, Council Seeks Action," "Independence Accusation.
Police Probe Demanded," "Probe Culminates in Chiefs Dismissal," and
"Police Probe Continues; Chief Ousted. "139 To base the City's liability on the
substantive content of newspapers, however, would not be sound law. This ap-
proach would infringe on the papers' first amendment rights. The Owen Court,
in no way, advocated any such restraint on the press. The result, then, is
municipal liability stemming from events outside the scope of municipal con-
trol.
This new standard allows a tenuous link between the city and the violation
to provide a broadened basis for municipal liability. It also allows high-ranking
officials to go beyond the bounds of their delineated authority and still im-
plicate the municipality. Given the Court's explicit holding in Owen that cities
cannot avail themselves of a good-faith defense, 14° the most likely result is an
unwarranted proliferation of actions for constitutional violations against the in-
creasingly vulnerable city.
'" The connection between the municipality and the deprivation of a federally protected
right may result from a policy or custom which, even though not approved by the lawmakers of
the government, has the force of law. Id. at 691. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970). See generally Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monet!, 79 COLUM. L. REV, 213, 215-27
(1979); Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom", 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 304 (1979).
"7
 445 U.S. at 624.
138
 See note 40 supra.
139 445 U.S. at 629 n.8.
' 40
 See section ILA. infra.
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II. THE DENIAL OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. The Owen Court's Opinion
By finding a constitutional violation in Owen the Supreme Court has fur-
ther confused the question whether a liberty interest exists in reputation. While
the opinion stopped short of holding that reputation alone is protected by the
due process clause, it expanded the circumstances in which a constitutional in-
jury can be found by minimizing the standard of proof needed to show a causal
connection between the defamation and the discharge. Thus, the opinion is a
step back from the Paul "stigma plus" requirement to Constantineau, where the
Court indicated that reputation alone is a protected interest. The majority may
have taken this step inadvertently, however, in an effort to reach a question left
unresolved in its prior decisions, namely, whether a city is entitled to qualified
immunity under section 1983. Ultimately, the Court may have to reexamine its
holding of reputational protection in Owen in light of its concomitant denial of a
good-faith defense.
In Owen the Supreme Court set out to decide whether a city may avail
itself of a good-faith defense in section 1983 actions. This section will address
the Court's rationale for deciding that a city cannot assert such a defense. This
aspect of the Owen decision will be analyzed first by discussing the Court's use
of the legislative history and common law of the mid-1880's. Next, the policy
considerations underlying the decision will be considered. Finally, the
ramifications of Owen for municipalities will be examined and potential
methods for cities to limit their liability will be suggested.
Prior to Owen, the Court in Monell v. New York Department of Social Services' 4 '
specifically left unanswered the issue of whether a municipality is entitled to a
good-faith defense in section 1983 actions.'" Although when first deciding
Owen's case against the City of Independence the court of appeals held that a
good-faith defense was not available to the City,'" on remand, after Monell was
decided, it modified this holding.'" The court of appeals reasoned that since
the City's discharge of Owen occurred more than two months before the Court
announced its decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 145 the City could not have
known that its actions had unreasonably deprived Owen of his constitutional
liberty interest.'" Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the good-faith
141
 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
142 Id. at 701. See text at notes 17-18 supra.
"3 560 F.2d at 941. The court held the defense "unavailable as a matter of law in cases
involving claims for backpay and similar equitable remedies which will be borne by a unit of
government and not individual office holders." Id.
144
 589 F.2d at 338.
143 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See note 4 supra.
146 589 F.2d at 338.
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defense should be extended to the City of Independence."' Other circuits,
however, were not in agreement on this issue. 148 In order to resolve this con-
flict, the Supreme Court granted Owen's petition for certiorari. 149 In a five-to-
four decision the Court held that a municipality is not entitled to qualified im-
munity based on the good-faith of its officials.' 5°
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, initiated his analysis of whether
a good-faith defense should be extended to municipalities by examining the
plain language of section 1983, and found no reference to any immunities."' A
review of the legislative history of section 1983 lent additional support to this
position and allowed Justice Brennan to conclude that the statute was intended
to have an expansive sweep to achieve its purpose of remedying constitutional
torts. 152
Prior to Owen, the Court had read certain immunities into section 1983.
For example, in Tenney v. Brandhovel" the plaintiff was summoned before a
state legislature committee. He claimed that the committee was trying to
frighten him into abandoning his efforts to cut off the committee's funding.' 54
He brought an action under section 1983 against various members of the com-
mittee.'" The Court held that the legislators were not liable.' 56 The Court rea-
soned that immunity for legislators was so well grounded in our history through
the speech and debate clause that Congress would not have abolished it without
a specific rnandate. 157 Since the Court had read certain immunities into section
1983, 159 in Owen Justice Brennan undertook an examination of the role of
municipal immunity at common law. Relying primarily upon Thayer v.
Boston, 159
 which allowed a city to be sued for acts of its officials done in accord
with their delegated authority, he concluded that there was no tradition of
municipal immunity in the common law at the time section 1983 was
147 Id.
148
 Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 n,1, aff'd per euriarn on
rehearing, 522 F.2d 204 (5th' Cir. 1975) (good faith of officials not extended to the college);
Hostrop Bd. of Junior College Dist. No, 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), ceri. denied, 425 U.S.
963 (1976) (good faith of board members not extended to board as an entity); Bursey v. Weather-
ford, 528 F.2d 483, 488 n.8 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (good faith
not applicable to defendants in their official capacities); Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (4th Cir.
1975) (same).
149
 444 U.S. 822 (1979).
"° Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 625 (1980).
15 ' Id. at 635.
152 Id. at 635-36.
' 53 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
"'" Id. at 370.
"5 Id. at 369.
156 Id. at 379.
1$7 Id. at 376.
' 58 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976) (prosecutor acting within
the scope of his employment absolutely immune); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)
(school officials enjoy qualified immunity); Schucr v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974)
(qualified immunity for governor and certain executive officers).
19 36 Mass. (9 Pick.) 511 (1837).
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enacted.'" Therefore, he concluded that municipal immunity could not be im-
plied in section 1983.
In order to refute more thoroughly any claim of a common law doctrine of
municipal immunity, Justice Brennan also addressed the doctrines of sovereign
immunity"' and of immunity based on the distinction between discretionary
and ministerial functions."' Both doctrines were found inapplicable to a good-
faith defense."' The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which the majority found
to have only a "nominal existence" at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1871
was enacted,'" was determined to be irrelevant to the issue of a qualified im-
munity defense."' The Court concluded that under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, a governmental body, in executing its governmental functions, was
afforded absolute immunity from suits unless the governmental unit agreed to
be sued. Thus, under sovereign immunity the issue is not whether agents were
acting in good faith but whether they were performing governmental or propri-
etary functions.'" Moreover, the Court noted, all traces of municipal sover-
eign immunity under section 1983 were abolished by Monett which expressly in-
cluded cities within the scope of that statute."' As for the immunity granted to
municipalities for discretionary decisions made by municipal employees, the
Court noted that such immunity evolved from the separation of powers doc-
trine.'" Thus, courts traditionally have been prevented from interfering in the
policy-making decisions of the legislative and executive branches where such
decisions were made in good faith. The Court concluded, however, that since a
court presiding over a section 1983 action would not be reviewing the reason-
ableness of a city's policies but rather only judging the constitutionality of the
implementation of those policies, the judiciary would not be substituting its
judgment of what the governmental policies should be for the cities.'" Thus,
the majority concluded that any immunity based on sovereign immunity prin-
ciples or a discretionary-ministerial distinction would not be appropriate.'"
In the final section of its analysis, the majority addressed what was ap-
160 445 U.S. at 642.
161 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on a governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion and derives from the immunity of the state. When the city acts in a governing capacity, it has
been traditionally immune from liability for common law torts. See W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 979 (4th ed. 197!).
1 " 2 Like the governmental-proprietary distinction, the discretionary-ministerial distinc-
tion also focuses on the nature of the act performed by the municipality. If the local entity was
employing a broad discretionary decisionmaking power, it was considered immune, but in the
actual implementation of the decision the city was to be treated as any other corporation. See 445
U.S. at 649.
163 445 U.S. at 644.
164 Id. at 646.
165 Id. at 647.
"6
 Id. at 646.
167 Id. at 647-48.
168 Id. at 648.
169 Id. at 649.
170 Id. at 650.
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parently the major factor in its decision — public policy. Concluding that "the
central aim" of section 1983 was the protection of those harmed by a "misuse
of power,"'" the Court stated that a damage remedy becomes a "vital compo-
nent" of such protection.' 72 Any allowance of a good-faith defense, the Court
explained, would render that component useless since most government of-
ficials enjoy a good faith defense. 13 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the
threat of damage remedies levied against municipal treasuries would increase
the diligence of cities and safeguarding of individual rights, 14 but would not in-
hibit individual officials in the performance of their duties. 179 Finally, the
Court pointed out that strict municipal liability was supported by the principle
of "equitable loss spreading" — so-called because the taxpayers who benefit
from municipal action bear the responsibility for city-induced injuries. 16
Therefore, the majority concluded that, since neither the history of the statute,
nor case law, nor principles of equity supported the use of a good-faith defense
by municipalities, strict liability was indeed appropriate.
While agreeing that the language of section 1983 does not refer to im-
munities,'" the dissent, written by Justice Powell, found that the Court's deci-
sion to deny municipalities a good-faith defense imposed strict liability on the
cities and conflicted with legislative intent, the common law, and the trend of
recent Supreme Court decisions toward extending immunity to officials in sec-
tion 1983 actions. 179 First, the dissent argued that the imposition of strict
liability was in opposition to the intent of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.' 79 Congress in 1871 refused to pass an amendment, written by
Senator Sherman, which would have imposed strict liability upon municipal-
ities.'" According to the dissent, when the 42nd Congress rejected the Sher-
man Amendment, it rejected the imposition of strict liability for
municipalities. 181
Second, in focusing upon the role of qualified municipal immunity at
common law, Justice Powell challenged the majority's use of case law,'" He
found that Thayer,'" the principal case used in Justice Brennan's examination
of the common law status of good-faith defenses for municipalities, had been
limited severely by subsequent Massachusetts cases decided prior to the enact-
171
 Id.
'" Id, at 651.
173 Id,
" 4 Id.
173 Id. at 656.
176 Id. at 657.
'" Id. at 666.
"8 Id. at 667.
176
 Id. at 670-71.
' 8° See text at notes 209-13 infra.
18 ' 445 U.S. at 675.
' 82 Id. at 679 (Powell, J., dissenting).
183 36 Mass. (9 Pick.) 511 (1837).
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ment of section 1983.' 84 In Hill u. Boston,'" which held that a municipality is
liable only when the city acts in a proprietary capacity.'" justice Powell found
that the court had applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 87 Furthermore,
the dissent rejected the Court's conclusions that neither the governmental-
propriety nor the discretionary-ministerial distinctions could be the basis for
qualified immunity for cities. The dissent found the governmental-proprietary
distinction so widely accepted when section 1983 was enacted that Congress
would not have expected it to be abrogated through silence. 198 To abolish such
a distinction, the dissent argued, would permit inappropriate judicial intrusion
into municipal decisionmaking.'" As for the discretionary-ministerial distinc-
tion, it had been recognized previously by the Court, according to Justice
Powell, as inherent to the separation of powers doctrine.' 90 The Owen Court, in
Powell's view, undermined this concept.'" Powell foresaw judicial review of
discretionary city acts resulting in distorted municipal decisionmaking and
discredit to the courts. 192
In weighing the policy considerations, the dissent concluded that the ma-
jority's "decision will hamper local government unnecessarily." 193 In capsuliz-
ing the dramatic change in the status of cities from absolute immunity to ab-
solute liability under section 1983, Justice Powell noted that the change oc-
curred "in just two short years" and that the new status of being held strictly
liable "converted municipal governance into a hazardous slalom through con-
stitutional obstacles that are often unkown and unknowable." 194 Since
"[c]onstitutional law is what the courts say it is," cities may not be able to
"know or anticipate when their action or inaction will be deemed a constitu-
tional violation." 196 For this reason justice Powell found that the use of a good-
faith defense would protect cities from these inevitable uncertainties. 196 For the
dissenters denial of a good-faith defense conflicted with their interpretation of
"basic fairness." 197
The dissent also was troubled by other aspects of the majority's deter-
minations concerning public policy. In particular, the dissent addressed what it
C84 445 U.S. at 679 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Child v. City of Boston, 86 Mass. (4
Allen) 41 (1862); Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 172, 173-74 (1861); Bigelow v,
Inhabitants of Randolph, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 541, 544-45 (1860).
'" 122 Mass. 344 (1877).
' 86 Id. at 359.
'" 445 U.S. at 679 (Powell, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 677.
'" Id. at 668.
' 96 Id. at 678.
191 Id.
192 Id.
' 93 Id. at 658.
194 Id. at 665.
19' Id. at 669.
196 Id.
L97 Id.
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considered to be the internal inconsistency in the majority's decision. While the
majority assumed that the imposition of strict liability would increase
municipal diligence in guarding constitutional rights, it also assumed that the
actual decisionmaking of individual policymakers would not be inhibited
because such policymakers would continue to be immune. According to Justice
Powell the Court apparently believed that the threat of damages resulting from
the City being held strictly liable would effectuate needed changes in city
policies by the individual officials. Yet the majority ignored the likely result
that officials will be hesitant to govern lest they cause injury resulting in liabili-
ty and thus risk their job security or jeopardize reelection potentials.'"
In countering the majority's concept of equitable loss-spreading among
the taxpayers, the dissent expressed concern that local governments will not be
able to afford the financial consequences of the decision. In critizing the ma-
jority's assumption that municipalities can best bear the burden, Justice Powell
stated that the majority ignored the precarious financial status of many local
governments.'" The dissent argued that by "ignoring the reality of municipal
finance" 27 00 Justice Brennan did not consider that as a result of Owen some
cities might have to limit programs and that the decision would have an
adverse effect on the welfare of the public."' Because of their concern regard-
ing Owen's financial impact on local governments, and because of their convic-
tion that the language and history of section 1983 did not support the denial of
a good-faith defense, the dissenters would have allowed limited municipal im-
munity.. In their view, any change in this defense ought to come from Congress
in the form of an explicit mandate. 202
Both Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, and Justice Powell,
writing for the dissent, initially treated the issue of the existence of a qualified
municipal immunity as one of statutory construction. The two opinions,
however, reflect different policy considerations. While the majority stressed the
need to compensate a plaintiff, the dissent emphasized concern that the im-
plementation of the Court's approach would result in dangerous financial con-
sequences for municipalities. Both of these policies are legitimate concerns,
and, therefore, must be balanced in devising an equitable solution to the
municipal immunity question. In the ensuing section it will be submitted that
the dissent struck the better balance and that the majority, in a zealous effort to
safeguard individual rights, overlooked important factors crucial to a fair deci-
sion.
B. Should There Be A Good-Faith Defense?
In holding that municipalities may not assert the good faith of their of-
ficers or agents as a defense to liability under section 1983, the Owen Court has
' 9D Id. at 669 n.9.
199 Id. at 670.
209 Id,
2°' Id.
292 Id. at 665.
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taken municipal governments from a position of absolute protection from
liability to a position of strict liability in those actions in only a two-year period.
For ninety years after its passage, section 1983 languished until 1961 when the
landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape203 initiated a period of civil rights litigation
under section 1983. 244 In Monroe the Court allowed municipal officials to be
sued under section 1983 for violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 205 The
Court concluded, however, that cities could not be sued since municipalities
were not persons within the language of the statute. 206 Although lower courts
attempted to devise means of circumventing the absolute municipal immunity
rule of Monroe, 207 it was not until 1978 that the Court in Monell v. New York
Department of Social Services recognized cities were suable entities under section
1983. 208 Now the Court has taken another major step, holding cities liable for
unknowable prospective constitutional violations without allowing municipal-
ities to avail themselves to a good-faith defense. In light of the history of section
1983, not only is this significant, it is also unwarranted.
In a comprehensive review of the legislative history of section 1983 under-
taken in Monell, the Court found that there was one stage of the statute's
development that was indicative of Congress's attitude toward municipal
liability. This stage was the history of the Sherman Amendment which,
although it did not amend section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precur-
sor of section 1983, 209 it did attempt to impose strict liability on municipalities
for acts of violence committed within their boundaries. 210 The first conference
2°' 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police officers broke into the home
of the Monroes, a black family, and forced them to stand naked in the living room while the of-
ficers "ransacked every room," Id. at 169. Mr. Monroe was taken to the police station and held
on "open" charges without being taken before an available magistrate or being allowed to com-
municate with his family. After ten hours he was released and no criminal charges were preferred
against him. Id. The Monroes brought suit under $ 1983 against the City of Chicago and the of-
ficers involved in the incident. The complaint charged, inter alia, that under color of state and
municipal law, the defendants violated the plaintiffs' fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. Both the district court and the court of appeals, 272 F.2d
365, 366 (7th Cir. 1959), found that the complaint failed to state a claim. The Supreme
Court reversed in part, 365 U.S. at 192, finding that the complaint stated a valid cause of action
against the individual officers when reading 5 1983 against a "background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Id. at 187. The Court
held, however, that the city was not a "person" within the meaning of $ 1983. Id. at 191.
Therefore, the municipality was absolutely immune from . suit under this statute. Id. at 191-92.
264 According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 11% of all civil
complaints filed for the year ending June 30, 1978, were listed as "Civil Rights-Other Civil
Rights" or "Civil Rights-Prisoner Petitions." Annual Report of the Directors at A16-A17. See
generally Developments, supra note 25, at 1167-75.
266 365 U.S. at 187.
2 °6 Id. at 191.
2 ° 7 See note 10 supra.
2 °6 Monell v, Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). The Court, recognizing that the Monroe rule was being eroded by some courts, see note 10
supra, granted certiorari to review its prior interpretation of 5 1983. In reviewing the legislative
history of 5 1983 and relevant case law of that era, the majority concluded that a city could be
sued for relief if the city caused a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 690.
209 See text and note at note 25 supra.
21 ° The original text of the amendment did not place liability for damage on the
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draft of the amendment provided that the local governmental entity would be
liable for the damage caused by "tumultuous" persons who were attempting to
deprive another of his federal rights. 2 " Senator Sherman, speaking in defense
of the strict liability amendment that he authored, construed the first con-
ference draft as consistent with his original attempt to impose liability upon the
landowners living within the geographical boundaries of the governmental en-
tity. 212
 On the floor of the Senate he declared: Met the people of property in the
southern States understand that if they will not make the hue and cry and take
the necessary steps to put down lawless violence in those States their property
will be holden responsible, and the effect will be most wholesome. "213
municipal entity but rather imposed the liability for damage caused by persons "riotously and
tumultuously assembled" upon any inhabitant of the municipality, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. at 633 (1871). Thus, wealthy landowners were to be held accountable for the damage.
Although the original version passed the Senate, it was altered subsequently by the Conference
Committee of the House of Representatives. 436 U.S. at 668.
2" Id. at 666.
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the Sherman amendment is:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary
shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed,
wholly or in part by any person riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or
if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged,
wounded, or killed by any person riotously and tumultuously assembled together,
with intent to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exer-
cising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
in every such case the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall
be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons
damnified by such offense, if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead;
and such compensation may be recovered in an action on the case by such person
or his representative in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in
the district in which the offense was committed, such action to be in the name of
the person injured, or his legal representative, and against said county, city, or
parish, and in which action any of the parties committing such acts may be joined
as defendants. And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied,
recovered by the plaintiffs in such action, may, if not satisfied, by the individual
defendant therein within two months next after the recovery of such judgment
upon execution duly issued against such individual defendant in such judgment,
and returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced against such county,
city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other
proceeding in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of judgments
against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all
monies in the treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other property
thereof. And the court in any such action may on motion cause additional parties
to be made therein prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. And
the said county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, by
it paid, with costs and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or
accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And
such county, city, or parish, so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiffs
rights under such judgment,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 749, 755 (1871).
2 " See note 210 supra.
2'3 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 164 (1871).
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The Monell Court reasoned that the Senator must have assumed that the
local entities made directly responsible for unconstitutional activity within their
boundaries would recoup any monetary losses by levying a property tax against
their inhabitants. 214 Although Senator Sherman claimed his proposal was
modeled on old English statutes imposing governmental liability 215 the Monell
Court concluded there were "critical differences" between the two. In the
amendment, unlike its English counterparts, liability was imposed on the city
whether or not it had notice of the impending riot, whether or not the city had
the power to intervene, and whether or not the city made reasonable efforts to
intervene. 216 The Monell Court found that these factors were significant distinc-
tions to the Senators who criticized the amendment. 2 " These Senators were
concerned about both the constitutionality of such a statute& and the potential
damaging effect such an act would have upon local governments. 2 ' 9 After
balancing the Sherman Amendment's potential effect of deterring violence,
against the probable adverse impact upon cities, Congress rejected strict liabili-
ty as the appropriate vehicle for preventing future constitutional abuses. 22 °
Given Congress's rejection of the amendment and the Monell Court's inter-
pretation of the amendment's history, the Court's repudiation of municipal
immunity in Owen must be seen as inconsistent with legislative intent and
judicial precedent.
While it can be argued that the Owen Court did not hold the City liable for
acts of a private individual and the holding, thus, is distinguishable from the
Sherman Amendment, this argument presumes that the City Councilman was
acting under color of municipal law. Such an argument, however, ignores that
the City explicitly prohibited the Councilman's behavior in its charter and that
the Councilman, therefore, was acting ultra vires. In Owen, the City was held
liable even though it had attempted to prevent such unauthorized actions
through explicit legislation. The City was held liable because the acts of a
highranking City official, even if ultra vires, merely appeared to be the acts of
the City. Thus, the Owen decision forces the conclusion that a city cannot pro-
tect itself through explicit legislation.
Furthermore, the Owen Court erroneously concluded that there was no
common law tradition of qualified municipal immunity. The Owen Court ig-
214 436 U.S. at 667 n.16.
215 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 761 (1871).
436 U.S. at 668.
217 Id.
2 ' B Id. at 664; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 804 (1871).
219
 The Court expressed some uncertainty over this precise point and in Monell "ex-
pressly declined to consider 'policy considerations' for or against municipal liability." 436 U.S.
at 664-65 nn.8-9.
22G
 The House of Representatives rejected the first conference draft. The second con-
ference draft which was ultimately passed imposed liability upon those persons who, although
knowing of a conspiracy to violate another's civil rights and having the power to intervene, stilt
allowed those rights to be violated. Municipal liability was abandoned. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. at 804 (1871).
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nored the well-grounded nineteenth century judicial policy of allowing im-
munity to cities performing governmental functions."' This policy was based
on the notion that a local government cannot execute its public functions if the
revenues of the city are depleted in remedying the torts committed by
municipal employees in the administration of those functions."' Given the
financial conditions of some municipalities, of which the dissent took judicial
notice, 223
 it is impractical and unrealistic for the Court to impose strict liability
on cities. Such an imposition might well drive some cities to insolvency. Some
cities would have inadequate fiscal resources to fulfill their governing function.
The majority must have assumed that cities would pass the financial burden on
to the taxpayers. Yet in so assuming the Court ignored the economic realities
currently faced by municipalities. In recent years some cities have been forced
to declare bankruptcy'' 4
 while others have had their resources severely cur-
tailed by voter-mandated decreases in property taxes."' City services may
have to be restricted to come within the cities' limited budgets. A threat of a
large money damages award may be so harmful to a city that it will enter into
settlements rather than risk an adverse judgment. The Owen Court has put the
cities in a position in which they have a great deal to lose and no defense to such
a loss.
Moreover, the Court's conclusion that there was no tradition of qualified
municipal liability is not supported in case law. The Court failed to carry its ex-
amination of case law through to its logical end. Principal support for the
Court's conclusion came from Thayer v. Boston. 226
 Yet the Owen Court failed to
deal with the critical stipulation underlying that decision. In Thayer, the
defendant city had agreed that the acts of the officials were within the scope of
their authority, and, therefore, the city had admitted that these acts were right-
ly its responsibility."' This stipulation was crucial to the decision if the of-
ficials' acts had not been within the scope of authority delegated to them by the
city, the officials would have been acting in a manner not authorized by the
municipal corporation. Their actions would have been ultra vires, and,
therefore, the officers would have been personally liable, not the city.'" Thus,
Thayer is not analogous to Owen, where the City agreed to no such stipulations.
Furthermore, by failing to distinguish Thayer on the basis of the stipulation, the
Owen Court never reached the question of how to define or limit the scope of an
official policy or custom that might result in the imposition of municipal liabili-
221 See Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 (1874); Board of Comm'rs of Hamilton
County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 100 (1857); Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on
Merrimac River, 7 Mass. 169 (1810).
222 See cases cited at note 221 supra.
223 445 U.S. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Business Week 23:22 (Jan. 1980).
224 See note 223 supra.
223 Id.
226
 36 Mass. (9 Pick.) 511 (1837).
2" "[F]or the purposes of the trial it was ruled that the defendants were responsible for
the acts of the officers of the city." Id at 513.
228
 36 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 516.
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ty. 229 The Court's silence on this important issue seems to compel the conclu-
sion that a city will always be deemed liable for the acts of its high-ranking of-
ficials.
In further support of its imposition of municipal liability the Court dis-
cussed a line of nineteenth century cases concerning the wrongful discharge of
municipal employees. 230 In those cases, cities were held liable for breaches of
contract. 231 Such cases are distinguishable from cases involving constitutional
violations. Since contracts set forth the duties of each party, often in explicit
language, actions which could constitute breaches and result in liability are
known to the parties. Constitutional law, however, because of its dynamic
nature, affords no such predictability. In not recognizing this significant
distinction, the Owen Court made cities potentially liable for violating the un-
knowable.
C. The Aftermath
There are significant problems that flow from the Owen holding with
respect to municipal liability, resulting in a onerous burden upon a municipal
entity. The enormity of this financial burden was underscored only two months
after Owen in Maine v. Thiboutot. 232 In Thiboutot the Court held that section 1983
liability encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. 233
Thus, municipalities can be strictly liable not only for violating constitutional
principles as yet undeveloped by the Court, but also for committing "errors in
the administration of complex federal statutes." 234 Moreover, although
Thiboutot expands the scope of section 1983 liability for all persons acting under
color of state law, the Owen decision makes the city the most vulnerable "per-
son." States, unlike municipalities have the protection of the eleventh amend-
ment, 235 and government officials may assert a good-faith defense. 236 Thus all
the potential section 1983 defendants, with the important exception of
municipalities, are protected in some manner from unknowable federal viola-
tions. It is the local government — perhaps the entity which can least afford to
"9 See note 136 supra.
13" 445 U.S. at 639 n.19.
23'
	 e.g., Richardson v. School Dist. No. 10, 38 Vt. 603, 606-07 (1866) (teacher
allowed to recover when discharged during school term in violation of contract); Paul v. School
Dist. No. 2, 28 Vt., 575, 577-78 (1856) (same).
232
	
U.S. 1 (1980). The plaintiffs in Thiboutot, a couple with eight children, three of
whom were the husband's by a previous marriage, brought a 5 1983 action asserting that the
state of Maine's interpretation of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 602(a)(7) (1976), deprived
them of welfare benefits to which they were entitled. The state had notified the husband that his
future AFDC benefits would not include any allowance for the five childen who were not ex-
clusively his. 448 U.S. at 3.
23 ' 448 U.S. at 4.
23'
	
at 22 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting). "Municipalities ... will be strictly liable for
errors in the administration of complex federal statutes." Id.
235 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
236 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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function as a deep pocket for any alleged violation — that is left alone on the
firing line.
In imposing this overwhelming potential liability, the Court never ex-
plained how such liability will deter constitutional violations, one of the goals of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Implicit in the Court's opinions in Owen and
Thiboutot is the concept that cities will be deterred from violating federal law
because of the fiscal ramifications. At the same time, however, the Court
postulated that by passing the cost along to the taxpayers, municipalities will
be able to absorb the awards made to plaintiffs under section 1983. 237 Whether
this is a valid assumption is unclear given the present financial status of some
municipalities and the emerging trend toward limiting the major source of
municipal revenue, the property tax. Thus the question remains: how will a
city be able to function effectively if it must guard against any action that may
cause a deprivation of a federal right? One means of possibile protection which
municipalities need to explore is the use of liability insurance to provide some
measure of security to city treasuries. 238 Otherwise, the unfortunate answer is
that municipalities may try to relinquish control of many of their programs to
the states in an effort to shelter themselves from section 1983 liability by argu-
ing they are the mere instruments carrying out a state policy. Since the
eleventh amendment grants absolute immunity to the states in federal court,
cities, in many instances, would not have to be concerned with states seeking
indemnity for money damages. Whether such a plan will afford cities protec-
tion, however, is uncertain. The cities may remain liable because, even though
carrying out state policy, it could appear to the public that the cities still have
control.
Another avenue which cities could explore is the use of indemnity suits
against its employees when employee actions result in municipal liability. The
problems with this approach, however, are obvious. Officials are entitled to
qualified immunity if sued directly under section 1983; 2 " presumably the same
immunity would be invoked if sued by the city. Furthermore, the threat that an
individual will have to pay a judgment undermines the very policy behind
qualified immunity for officials; without such a defense an individual's will-
ingness to participate in government employment will diminish. Additionally,
individuals, fearing liability, might be inhibited in their function as city
employees. Therefore, Owen has created a serious threat to municipal stability,
and cities may not have sufficient legal bases on which to fight for their
economic survival.
237
 445 U.S. at 656.
"' See note 174 supra.
239 445 U.S. at 666-67 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The Owen decision potentially affects the law in two significant ways.
First, the Owen Court's failure to examine closely whether the finding of a due
process violation has increased the uncertainty that surrounds the recognition
of a liberty interest in public employement. Now, after the Owen decision,
lower courts will face the dilemma whether the "stigma-plus" standard of Paul
is still a viable test or whether, as a result of Owen, reputational harm alone
mandates due process. Second, in holding that a municipality is strictly liable
for deprivations of constitutional rights caused by the municipality's broadly
defined policy or custom, the Court's decision may have disastrous conse-
quences for some municipalities. To avoid having to bear the financial respon-
sibility for the consequences of many of its programs, the cities may seek to
become the instruments of the states. The result may be the relinquishment of
control of many municipal programs to the states. Furthermore, the financial
impact is particularly burdensome when Owen is viewed in light of the Court's
holding in Maine v. Thiboutoi, which expanded section 1983 to include violations
of federal statutes. Presently cities are strictly liable for violating undeveloped
principles of constitutional law as well as for incorrectly interpreting or ad-
ministering complex federal statutory schemes. This liability may prove too
severe for our cities to handle. Therefore, the Court should reconsider the
trend toward expanding liability demonstrated in Owen to provide
municipalities at least some degree of fiscal protection.
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